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ABSTRACT: Many standardized tests purport to measure reasoning or argumentation skills (among them,
the Ennis-Weir, the International Critical Thinking, the California Critical Thinking and the Watson-Glaser
tests). Yet many commentators remain skeptical of their validity. I will look at some of these tests from the
point of view of the Toulmin model of argument, asking whether they satisfactorily test for the ability to
understand and assess the components of argument it identifies, and whether it could usefully inform the
future design of such testing instruments.
KEY WORDS: Critical Thinking, Testing, Ennis-Weir, Watson-Glaser, Claim, Data, Warrant, Backing,
Qualifiers, Rebuttal.

There are several critical thinking tests on the market today, many of which test for the
fundamental components of reasoning or argumentation. I am concerned with whether
such critical thinking tests as The Ennis-Weir and Watson Glaser fit with Toulmin’s
model of argument as he presents in Chapter III of The Uses of Argument (1958; 2003)
and in An Introduction to Reasoning (Toumin et al., 1984). In the analyses which follow,
I will explore the general structure of each test in order to decide whether or not the test
content (the set of critical thinking skills that the test purports to measure) is delineated
when the Toulmin six-part analysis is applied. The purpose of applying the Toulmin
model is that it can be used to test the validity of current critical thinking tests to the
extent that they actually test for core argumentation skills (content validity)—on the
assumption that core critical thinking skills are argument interpretation and evaluation
skills and that testing for these skills is the norm used in designing tests for critical
thinking. Further, I will argue that these analyses illustrate the broader influence of the
model: that it could meaningfully contribute to the design of better standardized critical
thinking testing instruments.
This paper has two parts. First, I will examine what I think is a very good test of
critical thinking – the Ennis-Weir Critical Thinking Essay Test, a test comparable in
format (but not necessarily in quality) to the International Critical Thinking Test. Second,
I will evaluate a fairly typical multiple choice critical thinking test, the Watson-Glaser
Critical Thinking Appraisal Form A, a test comparable in format to such tests as the
Cornell Critical Thinking Tests and the California Critical Thinking Skills Test.

1

Many thanks must go to Leo Groarke, who came up with the idea for this paper and to David Hitchcock
for proofreading it
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1. TESTING THE ENNIS-WEIR FOR TOULMIN
In my view, the Ennis-Weir test is the most valid one in terms of measuring the skills of
argument, particularly with respect to content-validity, for several reasons. First, the
manual provides for its users a definition of critical thinking accompanied by detailed
descriptions of the skills it attempts to measure under that definition. Second, the skills
tested for and described in the manual not only fit with those in Ennis’ textbook (and, I
might add, with the content of the Toulmin textbook), but the descriptions are
complemented by detailed grading criteria and a corresponding point system. The grading
criteria and point system create more potential for inter-rater reliability (the main problem
faced by users of essay tests), and so should lead us to greater pre- and post-test scoring
accuracy.
The Toulmin model of argument and the content that it generates for analysis is
similarly detailed, but still flexible because it is not grounded in any one discipline. The
model, then, is more readily comparable to such tests as the Ennis-Weir essay-style test
than it would be, say, to Form A of the California Critical Thinking Skills Test. The latter
test is purportedly based on a detailed definition of critical thinking (which
problematically includes dispositions), but then tests primarily for formal deductive
logic.2 Since the scope of the CCTST is so narrow, and reflects neither the general
definitional consensus of the community of critical thinking and informal logic theorists
nor the flexibility of the discipline-free Toulmin model, then we might waste time using
the Toulmin model to judge the content of such tests as the CCTST. 3 Hence, the natural
choice for testing the Toulmin model is the Ennis-Weir test.
The Ennis-Weir asks its students to assess ‘The Moorburg Letter,’ a letter to an
editor about the prohibition of street parking that is longer and more complex than one
typically found in the newspapers we read. Generally, testees are required to decide
whether the reasoning contained in each paragraph is strong or weak. This open-ended
question test is attempting to measure a skills-set very often used in critical thinking
courses and found in critical thinking or informal logic textbooks: the skills used to
interpret and evaluate everyday arguments.4 In the Ennis-Weir test directions, testees are
also instructed to support their overall judgment of the arguments contained in the letter

2

I am only here concerned with testing CT skills. As I have previously argued (ISSA 2002), I do not think
you can test dispositions such dispositions as one’s willingness to use skills, or one’s willingness to seek
truth or be fair- minded, in a context which demands the use of CT skills and then rewards or punishes
(with high or low grades) the use of those skills. In using a definition that includes dispositions, then, the
content validity of the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (CCTST) is compromised. For further
criticisms of the CCTST, see the APA AILACT proceedings (forthcoming on their website).
3
Or, for that matter, to use the test at all. On the CCTST, since the tool is multiple-choice items, students
are not able to show their reasoning for choosing certain answers – the most significant problem to consider
when constructing multiple-choice critical thinking test items.
4
For positions that illustrate that argument interpretation and evaluation skills are central to informal logic
and critical thinking teaching or textbook enterprises, see Alec Fisher and Michael Scriven (1997), Claude
Gratton (2001 OSSA proceedings) and Jan Sobocan (ISSA 2002/OSSA 2003 proceedings). Further, see the
six core CT skills and sub-skills agreed upon by experts contained in Peter Facione’s Delphi Report (1990),
commissioned by the APA: (1) interpretation; (2) analysis (identifying arguments); (3) evaluation
(evaluating arguments); (4) inference (querying evidence); (5) explanation (stating results/presenting
arguments); and (6) self-regulation (self-examination and correction).
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with cogent reasons (Manual, p. 12).5 The Ennis-Weir criteria that complement these
directions describe skills that might be considered sub-skills implied by the contents of
the Toulmin model, i.e. sub-skills which enable us, or in this case testees, to ‘subjec[t]
our [or others’] arguments to rational assessment’ (Toulmin, 2003, p. 88). Thus, the
application of the Toulmin model, like the tests in question, solicits the skills that enable
us to interpret and evaluate arguments.
Like the specific skills the Ennis-Weir attempts to measure, each structural
component of the Toulmin model implies a content that enables us to evaluate an
argument in more detail: what constitutes a reasoned claim, grounds (data or evidence),
warrant for the inference, backing for the warrant, and qualifiers and rebuttals. In
analyzing the grading criteria of the Ennis-Weir manual, one can see that the units of the
test (the paragraphs) as well as the skills tested for are quite similar to the components of
and content generated by the Toulmin model. Let us now explore these similarities more
extensively.
The skills mentioned in the manual (p. 1) include, but are not limited to, the
following: 1) identification of the conclusion, or claim; 2) finding reasons and
assumptions (grounds and warrants); 3) giving good reasons for one’s own points
(‘grounding’ the evaluation, providing facts/evidence); 4) seeing other possibilities or
identifying rebuttals (including other possible explanations to the ones given in the
letter); and 5) fallacy identification and/or avoiding committing fallacies in one’s own
evaluation (grounds, warrants, and qualifiers).
More specifically, the test asks test takers in their evaluations of the paragraphs to
recognize, interpret and evaluate various claims and, among other things, recognize the
‘…misuse of analogy…shifts in meaning…that an incorrect definition has been
stipulated…irrelevance…good arguments… and counter-claims or exceptions that were
not considered’ (Manual, pp. 1-10). After being tested for these interpretive and
evaluative skills, the student must conclude by making an overall judgment of the
argument, and must provide reasons for that judgment independent of a summary of their
paragraph evaluations (Manual, p. 9). The test and Toulmin share a fallacy approach to
making judgments about the rationality of others’ or one’s own argument, as I shall now
show in more detail.
Grounds and warrants
Ennis-Weir testees, like those studying argument with the Toulmin model, would use a
fallacy approach most often in evaluating the grounds and warrants of an argument. The
Ennis-Weir focuses on the same fallacies as those in Toulmin et al.’s Introduction to
Reasoning (1984), the fallacies of ‘defective grounds’ and ‘unwarranted assumptions’
5

The skills thus tested may be considered the skills of self-regulation or the skills related to the
construction of an argument. I think that the instruction directly tests for self-regulation. The Ennis-Weir
test may indirectly measure a student’s general ability to construct an argument, i.e., the one they are
making in support of their overall judgments of the strength of the reasoning contained in the extended
passage (see manual p. 1). Only one point is accorded to this general ability. This raises the question as to
how important are the abilities to self-regulate and to construct arguments, and whether the Toulmin model
is most helpful in learning how test for those specific abilities. This is an important question, one that I
cannot address in the space of this paper. However, those CT teachers who focus on composition (Hatcher
and Fulkerson, for examples) might find it worth their while to further explore this issue.
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(pp. 139-167). The Ennis-Weir grading criteria indicate that students should receive
points for recognizing defective grounds (Toulmin et al., 1984, p. 151) or, as stated in the
manual, recognize insufficient information and/or false cause (paragraph six, Manual p.
15). Other close similarities include the following: in paragraph four students are to
recognize circularity (discussed by Toulmin et al. as ‘missing grounds,’ pp. 135-137), in
paragraph one false analogy (Toumin et al., p. 161) and unwarranted assumption
(paragraph six, Manual p. 7). Students must also recognize what is relevant, but the
testing for recognition of relevance is only indirect, because the test criteria do not
indicate that testees recognize in the letter a fallacy of irrelevance, but rather require that
the testees not commit fallacies of irrelevance in their own reasoning -- or points will be
deducted from their total score.6 Toulmin et al. (1984) discuss relevance fallacies in the
same way, but call them ‘fallacies resulting from irrelevant grounds’ (p. 139). It is clear
that what Toulmin considers the most important fallacies with respect to grounds and
warrants are captured within the Ennis-Weir test question and criteria. The Ennis-Weir,
therefore, does clearly test for content under the categories of grounds and warrants
through a fallacy approach to argument.
Rebuttal and qualifiers
What is also clear is that some skills related to the rebuttal and qualifier parts of the
model are also tested for by the Ennis-Weir (though perhaps not as extensively as
grounds and warrants through fallacy identification). In paragraphs five and six, points
are awarded for identifying other possible explanations (rebuttals) that affect the testees’
acceptance of certain data, grounds or warrants in sub-arguments. The best example of
identifying the rebuttal aspect of the argument is in paragraph five, where testees are
expected to identify that there are several ways other than eliminating overnight parking
in which to prevent accidents from occurring on a busy street (Manual, p. 7). Given the
other possibilities that challenge the claim that removing overnight parking would
eliminate such accidents, testees are indeed expected to ‘…indicat[e] circumstances in
which the general authority of the warrant would have to be left aside’ (Toulmin, 2003, p.
94). The Toulmin model very clearly explains the test content in this regard, and the
Ennis-Weir, though using different descriptors, also tests for the components.
Three aspects of the Ennis-Weir test clearly test the qualifier component of the
Toulmin model. First, testees are to illustrate in their answer that a conclusion needs
qualification in order to be judged reasonable. For example, the grading criteria for
paragraph eight specify that testees are expected to notice that the author properly (and
importantly) qualifies a conclusion and that this is one of the strengths of the argument
(Manual, p. 8). That is, testees are said to properly interpret the argument if they notice
that ‘…the letter writer has shown the recommendation to be a probable sufficient
condition for eliminating one kind of accident, but not a necessary condition’ (Manual, p.
6).
Second, the manual also highlights that it is ‘crucial’ that testees illustrate an
understanding of how the absence of a qualifier with respect to a categorization of streets
6

I see this activity of avoiding committing fallacies as a form of self-regulation, which is important to note
because it is one of the skills that is considered central to CT, is most difficult to test, and is one often
missing from most tests (especially multiple-choice tests, because of their format).
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weakens the support provided by the author (who refers to a street that does not
necessarily belong in the universal category of ‘busy streets’ referred to by authorities).
Third, testees are expected to properly qualify their own overall conclusion
(paragraph nine), where they are to support their judgment with a reference to the
strength or force of the overall argument. (Manual, p. 9). More specifically, they are to
write a qualified and reasoned judgment of how strong they think the argument is, based
on the balance between the force of the errors contained in the weak paragraphs and the
force of the paragraphs judged to contain strong reasoning. It should be clear that the
Ennis-Weir does indeed reflect the qualifier aspect of the Toulmin model. Let us now see
if the Ennis-Weir tests for the backing component.
An Ennis-Weir test question that identifies backing occurs in paragraph eight. It
relates to two appeals to authority for the claim that parking should be prohibited on busy
city streets (the appeals to authority being the warrants). The authority is not one that the
testees should automatically ‘accept,’ and so backing, taken as that which would render
the parking argument warrant acceptable as having authority, must be provided (Toulmin,
2003, p. 95). The proper backing necessary to accept the assumption as a good one is not
provided by the letter writer. The assumption or warrant that cannot be automatically
accepted is that Moorburg (and its busy streets) is the same as other cities its size. As the
manual instructions for grading indicate, ‘Moorburg might well be different than other
cities its size’ (p. 9). The testees must recognize, therefore, the backing necessary for the
warrant: that Moorburg is indeed typical of cities of the size cited by the authority.
Though the example above illustrates that the backing component can be
identified, that the component is field-specific is not clearly explained by this test. The
lack of a clear explanation may be due to the fact that no explicit discipline or fieldspecific criteria come to mind when judging the backing in this example.7 I will now
briefly turn to this weakness in applying the Toulmin analysis, testing for field
specificity. Unlike the qualifier component, there is a theory behind the backing
component of the Toulmin model that I think was not tested or explained by the EnnisWeir test and manual (even though there is one good example where general backing is
called for). One possible reason for the difficulty is, as already stated, that the arguments
being analyzed were not identified as requiring specific kinds of backing when indeed the
‘backing called for by our warrants varies from one field of argument to another’
(Toulmin et al., 1984, p. 96). Such criteria might implicitly be solicited from students;
that is, they might inadvertently identify the appropriate backing to support their own
identification of unwarranted assumption fallacies (see discussion, p. 3). Although the
solicitation of field-specific backing is not explicit in the test, it could be made explicit
given that one paragraph takes up a causal claim, another reasoning from authority,
another from generalization, and yet another from classification.8
A difficulty with soliciting interpretation skills to identify the field-specificity of
any backing might result from the ease of conflating field-specific criteria (applicable to
7

However, incorporating the skills-set into a class and the test is a possibility, because the paragraphs in the
Ennis-Weir test are clearly classified, and much in the same way they are classified in Toulmin’s textbook
(pp. 213-235).
8
This highlights a problem with my initial working assumption, that I equate core critical thinking skills
with core argumentation skills. Many critical thinking theorists see CT as subject-specific, perhaps in the
way that Toulmin sees arguments as field-specific. I see many of the core CT skills as more of a
generalizable skills-set.
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certain uses or types of arguments such as value claims or causal claims) and disciplinespecific criteria (such as ethics, science, law, medicine, psychology, and so on). Though
many of us have a tendency to ground argument types or critical thinking skills in a
discipline, often times many arguments, especially the type of argument and
corresponding evidence presented in the Moorburg letter, do not neatly fit into a given
discipline or argument field. Given these difficulties, in particular given the debate over
whether critical thinking skills are subject-specific or generalizable, such a complicated
notion as field specificity may be too inflexible to incorporate into the grading criteria of
a manual (and it certainly would extend an already lengthy grading task). Though there
are these difficulties, it is still quite possible that the notion of field-specific backing
could be made more explicit in the answers expected of students (making more explicit
the skills we are testing for). Even with the limitations I have here discussed, I remain
convinced that the Toulmin model is flexible enough to apply in order to understand or
design tests, so long as we do not insist on the strict identification of backing within a
given argument field.
Given that all parts of the Toulmin model can be detailed in the Ennis-Weir essay
test, and that those not so easily identified can be incorporated into the test, I conclude
that the Ennis-Weir critical thinking test indeed sufficiently tests for the components of
the Toulmin model of argument, and that the Toulmin model helps to explain in more
detail parts of the test that solicit critical thinking skills, especially as they relate to
warrant, qualifier, rebuttal, and backing. The Toulmin model, then, can help us a great
deal in identifying and organizing the skills tested for and so informs our judgments of
content validity.
2. TESTING THE WATSON-GLASER FOR TOULMIN
Let us now look to a multiple-choice test, Form A of The Watson-Glaser Critical
Thinking Appraisal, to decide if and how it reflects all the components of the Toulmin
argument model. Since many, if not all, multiple-choice critical thinking tests are divided
into categories that tend to reflect different parts of Toulmin’s argument analysis, it
seems that they would be more apt to test for aspects of the Toulmin model. However, in
virtue of their format, multiple-choice questions and answers do not usually solicit from
testees the detailed evaluation of reasoning that the model demands. I think many critical
thinking theorists would agree that multiple-choice critical thinking tests on the market
today contain a greater proportion of formal deductive logic than they should.9 Given this
fault in the format itself, and given that the Toulmin model of argument was developed to
explain arguments in greater detail than formal logic could, I began the analysis with
great doubt that such tests as the Watson-Glaser or California Critical Thinking Skills
Test would test, in any comprehensive way, the skills needed to use the Toulmin model to
judge arguments. Nevertheless, it is important to evaluate a test that is formatted
differently than the Ennis-Weir, in order to determine whether the design of multiplechoice tests could improve with the use of the Toulmin analysis.

9

For these arguments, see Fisher and Scriven (1997), who argue that no greater than 20% of any test
should test for formal deductive logic (p. 129) and Leo Groarke and Kevin Possin (APA AILACT
proceedings (2005), forthcoming).
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The first section of form A on the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal,
‘Test 1,’ purportedly tests for ‘Inference’ skills. This section, in the main, parallels the
qualifier element of the Toulmin model, for the testees are asked to decide the strength of
each inference, from the alternatives ‘definitely true, probably true, insufficient data,
probably false and false’ (p. 1). Though there is this parallel, the skills needed to decide
whether there are ‘insufficient data’ belong more to the evaluative skills that would be
necessary to judge the presence of reasonable grounds and backing. Further complicating
identification of what specific skills-set this section tests for (and thus assessment of the
test’s validity) is the fact that the instructions indicate that ‘…each exercise begins with a
statement of facts that you are to regard as true’ (p. 1). One might immediately and
rightly conclude that this instrument does not satisfactorily test for the warrant and
backing components of Toulmin, since the testees are to assume truth (acceptability). In
the case of such an instruction, the testees are neither asked to evaluate any inferencelicense nor to examine the evidence that backs that license.
Let us find out if the other sections remedy this deficiency in testing for
evaluation skills. The second section, ‘Test 2’, entitled ‘Recognition of Assumptions’,
again may seem to test for skills under warrants, as this part of the Toulmin model is
concerned with the identification of implicit or unstated propositions. However, warrants
within the pattern of the Toulmin analysis are more detailed than assumptions examined
within the field of formal (propositional) logic, which most of the Watson-Glaser test
content reflects. As Toulmin (2004) explains, in establishing warrants we are also
concerned with counter-assertions (p. 91). An example from the test will illustrate that the
types of questions in this section, and in the test as a whole, do not solicit detailed enough
answers from testees to sufficiently test for the warrant (and backing) components of the
Toulmin model.
In the Assumption section, the instructions indicate only that testees should
identify ‘what is taken for granted’ in the statements given. In this example, three
potential assumptions are listed following the statement ‘Zenith is the city to move to- it
has the lowest taxes.’ They are: 1) ‘Lower taxes imply efficient city management’; 2) ‘In
deciding where to live, it is important to avoid high taxes’; 3) ‘The majority of the
residents in Zenith are content with their present city government.’ For each proposed
assumption, students are asked to identify whether implicit propositions are ‘made’ or
‘not made.’ Without the ability to express the reasoning behind a choice of one of two
answers, it is not possible for students to bring forward counter-assertions that would lend
the necessary Toulmin authority to the assumption or warrant chosen. For example, in
deciding where to live, for (2), to know if the choice of assumption made was reasonable,
we would also have to know an assumption made by the testee: which income bracket the
person arguing for Zenith is in. The testee choice of either ‘assumption made’ or ‘not
made’ is dependent upon whether the testee has indeed assumed that the person making
the statement can be taken as one not within a high income bracket (a counter-assertion).
The test does not allow for this kind of detailed consideration, and the Toulmin model
requires it. Thus, the interpretive skills necessarily related to establishing whether a
warrant is reasonable, especially those that lead to a proper application of backing, are
eliminated by the Made-Not Made (essentially true-false) choice. Though in a limited
sense this section might reflect some of the skills involved in an identification of warrant,
it eliminates the important aspect that Toulmin’s notion of warrant lends to the use of

TESTING WITH THE TOULMIN MODEL

449

argument evaluation skills. The test, then, clearly does not test for the backing necessary
to justify the warrant. This section does not, therefore, reflect the warrant (and backing)
aspects of Toulmin in any depth.
‘Test 3’ of the Watson-Glaser is headed ‘Deduction.’ Again in this section testees
are, for the purposes of the test, to ‘consider the statements in each exercise as true
without exception.’ They are then instructed to read a set of premises and decide whether
the conclusion provided ‘follows’ or ‘does not follow.’ The example question the test
provides is ‘Some holidays are rainy. All rainy days are boring. Therefore, 1. No clear
days are boring.’ Students are to deduce from the premises (the first two sentences) that
the conclusion ‘does not follow.’ This type of question could be said to loosely mimic the
Toulmin model in that it tests for interpretation skills that relate to the ‘gross anatomical
structure’ of an argument (Toulmin, 2003, p. 87). However, it is clear that these sorts of
questions fall into a category of argument belonging to formal logic, and that the Toulmin
model was developed specifically to analyze or form a pattern of analysis that
investigates and evaluates beyond formal logic to the micro or ‘finer argument
structure[s]’ (Toulmin, 2003, p. 87). For some people, especially for deductivists and
those critical thinking teachers who use reconstructive deductivism to teach critical
thinking, this section might remain important for testing interpretation skills related to a
general argument structure that might fall into one of Toulmin’s classifications. It is
important to reiterate, however, that this section like the others before it fails to validly
test for the argument evaluation skills necessary to judge whether grounds, warrant and
backing are reasonable.
In ‘Test 4’ of the Watson-Glaser, ‘Interpretation,’ testees are again instructed to
check one of two potentially correct answers: whether the conclusions provided ‘follow’
or ‘do not follow’ from the set of premises. As opposed to test section 3, where the
questions are much more artificial, this section includes more detailed reasoning of the
kind we might encounter more frequently in our everyday lives. Still, the finer argument
structures of the Toulmin model are not clearly tested for here, given the limit that is put
on the testees’ choice of answers. In this section some arguments are classified, as there is
one argument from generalization and three causal arguments – and so the test is, though
to a lesser extent than the Ennis-Weir, somewhat amenable to Toulmin’s backing
component. It is amenable, but only if the students would also be asked to identify in
further items the argument field from a range of answers, and to complement their
choices with short answers as to the type of evidence required within a given field. This
amendment to the test–using multiple-rating items–would be major. However, it would
help to incorporate the elements of the Toulmin model, without having as many grading
and inter-rater reliability difficulties as essay tests.10 In this way, the Toulmin model
would help inform the design of tests that are better for pre- and post testing purposes.
Although such an amendment would begin to eliminate some of the problems with the
Watson-Glaser, the most glaring problem is that it does not test for, in any depth, the kind
10

Michael Sciven and Alec Fisher (1997) suggest using the multiple-rating item to alleviate some of the
problems with and/or address the common criticisms of multiple-choice critical thinking items, such as I
have alluded to here. The Cornell tests excepted, many multiple-choice items merely test for background
information (John McPeck’s criticism), and they limit a student’s ability to express reasoning (Robert
Ennis’ criticism). For further explorations of these criticisms and other issues around testing, see Fisher and
Scriven (1997) and refer to Robert Ennis’ Manual for the Ennis-Weir.
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of evaluative skills central to the critical thinking process that the Toulmin pattern of
analysis solicits (the ability to clearly support one’s thinking with reasons, the recognition
of fallacies, ability to see alternatives or qualify conclusions appropriately, and so on). It
is a glaring problem because critical thinking teachers, informal logicians and
argumentation theorists alike would expect that these skills would be central to any
summative critical thinking evaluation.11
The last section of the test, ‘Test 5,’ is titled ‘The Evaluation of Arguments.’ This
section is the most promising one with respect to testing grounds, perhaps also warrant
and backing. It vaguely promises to test a set of skills that illustrate a student’s judgment
of reasons. It is important to note that this section also excludes a decision about the truth
value of each statement, and perhaps even the qualifier component, as testees are again
instructed to regard each argument as true. Students must then choose (based on other
unspecified criteria) between two categories: ‘argument strong’ and ‘argument weak’
with respect to a single premise.
Let us look at the sample question given in an attempt to ferret out which skills
are being tested for. The sample question is: ‘Should all young men in the United States
go to college?’ Students are hypothetically to decide whether the following two reasons
are strong or weak: (1) ‘Yes; college provides an opportunity for them to learn school
songs and cheers.’ (2) ‘No; a large percent of young men do not have enough ability or
interest to derive and benefit from college training.’ The sample answer for (1), which is
supposed to provide an example of a reason why one might judge the premise in support
of the conclusion that all men go to college ‘weak,’ is ‘This [learning songs and cheers]
would be a silly reason for spending years in college.’ The sample reason for thinking
that (2) is strong is ‘If this [a large percent of young men are not able or motivated] is true
[as the directions require us to assume] it is a weighty argument against all young men
going to college.
It is perhaps needless to say that the test does not clearly test for or show that the
student applied any reasoning process, certainly not the specific skills necessary to
evaluate grounds or reasons, properly qualify claims, investigate backing, and so on
(what we would expect in a section on the evaluation of arguments when using Toulmin).
Indeed, the student has 50% chance to guess correctly. Therefore, even if such test
questions did somehow capture the details of grounds, warrants, backing, and qualifier,
we would not be able to discern whether the testees actually possessed those skills.12
Though the test does not satisfactorily test for the components of the Toulmin model, I do
think that the Toulmin structuring of an argument (and its analysis) could usefully inform
the future design of any test because it shows us how we can broaden the range of
argument skills tested for in the multiple-choice format.

11

A test comparable to the Watson-Glaser, and so subject to the same criticisms I have discussed here in
terms of the Toulmin model, is The California Critical Thinking Skills Test.
12
I think that practice or sample questions that are incorporated into the test could be considered a weakness
of the test: the sample questions are really a form of ‘teaching to the test’ that compromises the ability to
determine how independently a student can reason (we could say that the student becomes more familiar
with the question type, and so better at choosing a correct answer based on that familiarity). The samples
might also be viewed as a strength, if viewed in terms of the quality of the instructions to study (a factor in
the validity of any test in terms of exam context).
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CONCLUSION
The importance of my analyses here is twofold. First, it illustrates that the content
implied by the Toulmin model parallels and/or complements the skills-set included under
the Ennis-Weir critical thinking test rubric, and so offers much in the way of
understanding what skills are common to both critical thinking and argumentation. In my
examination of the Ennis-Weir, I have shown that the model can help us to judge the
strengths of various tests in relation to content validity. It also enables us to better
structure or categorize the argument interpretation and evaluation skills necessary to any
critical thinking process, and so to express them in greater detail through our test
questions and in our test manuals. Second, because the model details the content of an
evaluation skills-set, it could be used to improve the design of multiple-choice and other
test items similar to those found in the Watson-Glaser.
The broader implication of this exercise is that the Toulmin approach is flexible;
that is, the model itself is not discipline-specific. Thus it is a good starting point, a
stipulative ‘definition’ of ‘critical thinking’ if you will, which could be used 1) to critique
various tests with a view to their improvement and 2) to develop new tests. I see in the
model great potential to help us develop agreement on a core critical thinking or
argumentation skills-set that can be captured on both essay and multiple-choice tests. If
this is too ambitious, the discovery that the Toulmin model can be used as a type of
evaluation tool to investigate the content validity of our current tests is important enough.
The broader and more practical implication of this exercise, then, is that it is quite
possible to use Toulmin argument analysis to evaluate the tests we create, and so to
strengthen the validity of our accountability procedures as well as our procedures for
designing new critical thinking tests.
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